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VMG Salsoul, L.L.C. v. Ciccone: The Ninth Circuit Strikes




When the principles of "thou shalt not steal" and "the law does not
concern itself with trifles"-de minimis non curat lex--clash, which should
control a court's analysis? The Ninth Circuit confronted the issue in VMG
Salsoul, L.L.C. v. Ciccone, where the famous singer, Madonna Louise Cic-
cone, faced a copyright infringement suit claiming she used a copyrighted
sound recording without permission in creating the song, Vogue., On review
of summary judgment in favor of Madonna, the Ninth Circuit held that the
unlicensed use of the copyrighted sound recording was not infringement be-
cause the average consumer could not recognize the appropriation.2 Ciccone
split from the Sixth Circuit's ruling twelve years ago in Bridgeport Music,
Inc. v. Dimension Films, which held that any unlicensed copying was in-
fringement.3 While this circuit split has created a dangerous gray-area in cop-
yright law, the Ninth Circuit's approach better agrees with copyright
jurisprudence. This agreement is evidenced by the rulings of lower courts
throughout the country, proposed legislation in Congress, and popular opin-
ions in the field of copyright law. In applying this exception, the Ninth Cir-
cuit cemented support for a growing area of the music industry that makes
use of small amounts of sound recordings to create an artistic "collage" that
has been growing in popularity since the turn of the century.
II. BACKGROUND
Copyright protection for music can be traced back to the Copyright Act
of 1909. The Copyright Act of 1909 covered musical compositions, but this
protection only extended to a work's musical score and lyrics, which produce
sound when played.4 Actual recordings of the composition, the composition-
produced sound fixed in a phonorecord or other medium, were not protected
by copyright until a 1971 amendment to the Copyright Act of 1909, which
was later incorporated into the Copyright Act of 1976 (Copyright Act).5 This
protection arose after Congress became concerned with the prevalence of the
unauthorized duplication of sound recordings, now easily performed with re-
* J.D. Candidate, SMU Dedman School of Law; B.A. History Cum Laude, 2015,
University of North Texas.
1. VMG Salsoul, L.L.C. v. Ciccone, 824 F.3d 871, 875 (9th Cir. 2016).
2. Id. at 874.
3. Bridgeport Music, Inc. v. Dimension Films, 410 F.3d 792, 800-01 (6th Cir.
2005).
4. See Copyright Act of 1909 § 5, 35 Stat. 1075, 1076-77 (1909).
5. 17 U.S.C. §§ 101, 106 (2010).
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cord and tape devices.6 Congress defined these protectable "sound record-
ings" as works that result: "from the fixation of a series of musical, spoken,
or other sounds, but not including the sounds accompanying a motion picture
or other audiovisual work, regardless of the nature of the material objects,
such as disks, tapes, or other phonorecords, in which they are embodied."7
While copyrights in musical compositions and sound recordings are
similar, they are distinct and can be separately held. The copyright in a musi-
cal composition frequently vests with the composer/lyricist and gives that
creator the right to reproduce, prepare derivative works, distribute copies,
and perform or display the work in public.8 In contrast, the copyright in a
sound recording vests in the party that fixes the music to a phonorecord or
other device, which is usually the record company. 9 The rights given to the
owner of a copyrighted sound recording are more limited, reserving only the
right to reproduce, prepare derivative works, distribute copies, and perform
the work publicly by means of a digital audio transmission.o The copyright
is further limited in scope by Section 114(b) of the Copyright Act, which
limits the rights listed in Section 106.11 Of special relevance in this case is
the limitation that the right to reproduce and prepare derivative works does
not extend to sound recordings that consist entirely of other sounds, even if
those sounds imitate or simulate the copyrighted recording.12
Sound recording copyrights became the subject of controversy with the
rise of digital sampling, where sounds from a preexisting recording are phys-
ically copied for use in a new recording and possibly modified with changes
to some sound qualities like pitch and tempo.1 3 Sampling took off in the mid-
1980s, and it quickly became clear that sampling provided many advantages
to new artists, since the price of sampling equipment was far cheaper than the
6. MELVILLE B. NIMMER & DAVID NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT
§ 2.10(A)(1)(c) (2013).
7. 17 U.S.C. § 101 (2010).
8. Id. §§ 106(l)-(5).
9. Id. § 106; see M. Leah Somoano, Case Note, Bridgeport Music, Inc. v. Dimen-
sion Films: Has Unlicensed Digital Sampling of Copyrighted Sound Record-
ings Come to an End?, 21 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 289, 291 (2006).
10. 17 U.S.C. § 114(a) (2010) (citing 17 U.S.C. §§ 106(1)-(3), (6) (2002)).
11. Id. § 114(b).
12. Id. ("The exclusive rights of the owner of copyright in a sound recording under
clauses (1) and (2) of section 106 do not extend to the making or duplication of
another sound recording that consists entirely of an independent fixation of
other sounds, even though such sounds imitate or simulate those in the copy-
righted sound recording.").
13. VMG Salsoul, L.L.C. v. Ciccone, 824 F.3d 871, 875 (9th Cir. 2016) (citing
Newton v. Diamond, 388 F.3d 1189, 1192 (9th Cir. 2003)).
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production costs of hiring musicians or recording in a studio.14 Litigation
soon followed, with owners of sampled recordings arguing that this practice
constituted copyright infringement.15 One of the first cases to address sam-
pling was Grand Upright Music Ltd. v. Warner Bros. Records, Inc. The
Southern District of New York's opinion was clear from the first sentence:
"Thou shalt not steal."16 While the case primarily dealt with the ownership of
a sound recording, the court opined that the defendants knew they were vio-
lating plaintiffs right by not acquiring a license.17 But sampling, both unau-
thorized and authorized, continued to expand in popular music, with almost a
third of the songs on the Billboard 100 in 1999 containing sampled sound
recordings in some capacity.18
This is where the legal principle of de minimis non curat lex (commonly
translated as the law does not concern itself with trifles) comes into play.19
The prinbiple, commonly referred to as the de minimis exception, means that
a violation of the law can be so minimal that it does not give rise to a legal
consequence. 20 The U.S. Supreme Court has held that all laws, "absent a
contrary indication," accept this principle implicitly.21 As applied to copy-
right law, the de minimis exception is applied when a court is determining if
a case of infringement is actionable.22 To determine if a protected work has
been infringed, a court must determine: (1) that copying did, or could have,
taken place; and (2) that the degree of similarity between the protected ele-
ments of the original work and the infringing work is substantial enough for
14. See Danielle L. Gilmore & Kenneth L. Burry, Feature: 13th Annual Ent. Law
Issue: Healthy Sampling: Digital Music Sampling Creates High-Stakes Chal-
lenges to Existing Copyright Law for the Recording Industry, 20 L.A. LAW. 40,
42 (1997).
15. Id.
16. Grand Upright Music Ltd. v. Warner Bros. Records, Inc., 780 F. Supp. 182
(S.D.N.Y. 1991).
17. Id. at 184-85 (alleging that the use of three words and the accompanying back-
ground music was actionable infringement).
18. Tonya Evans, Sampling, Looping, and Mashing ... Oh My!: How Hip Hop
Music is Scratching More than the Surface of Copyright Law, 21 FORDHAM
INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & Err. L.J. 843, 856-57 (2011) (discussing the history
of hip hop and its use of sampling).
19. De Minimis Non Curat Lex, BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014).
20. Ringgold v. Black Entm't Television Inc., 126 F.3d 70, 74 (2d Cir. 1997); see
Fisher v. Dees, 794 F.2d 432, 434 n.2 (9th Cir. 1986).
21. Wisconsin Dep't of Revenue v. William Wrigley, Jr., Co., 505 U.S. 214, 231
(1992) ("[T]he venerable maxim de minimis non curat lex ('the law cares not
for trifles') is part of the established background of legal principles against
which all enactments are adopted, and which all enactments (absent contrary
indication) are deemed to accept.").
22. Ringgold, 126 F.3d at 74-75.
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the infringement to be actionable.2 3 De minimis applies in the "substantial
similarity" step, as a portion copied can be so trivial that the infringing work
is not substantially similar to the protected work and thus, not actionable.24
In applying the de minimis principle to musical copyrights, the Ninth
Circuit addressed the rule with regards to musical compositions in Newton v.
Diamond. In Newton, defendants sampled a six-second, three-note piece
from plaintiffs protected song.25 The court concluded that it was not neces-
sary to obtain a license for the use of the musical composition, embodied in
the sound recording, because the portion copied was so minimal that it in-
voked the de minimis exception.2 6 But the court left open the question
whether the de minimis exception could be applied to sound recordings.27
The Sixth Circuit addressed that question in Bridgeport v. Dimension
Films, where defendant copied a two-second, three-note guitar riff from the
protected work, lowered the pitch, looped the piece to last for seven seconds,
and then repeatedly played the copy over the course of the infringing work.28
In deciding Bridgeport, the court construed Sections 106 and 114(b) of the
Copyright Act to create the "contrary indication" from Congress that the Su-
preme Court said was required to reject the de minimis principle.29 The result
was a bright-line infringement rule, where copying of any amount would be
considered actionable infringement, absent another defense (e.g. fair use).30
This rule met resistance from district courts outside the Sixth Circuit but was
not scrutinized by another Court of Appeals until the Ninth Circuit decided
VMG Salsoul v. Ciccone on June 2, 2016.31
23. Id. at 75.
24. Id.
25. Newton v. Diamond, 388 F.3d 1189, 1190 (9th Cir. 2003).
26. See id. (finding the defendant had obtained a license for the use of the sound
recording, so the court did not address if the same analysis could be applied to
infringing on sound recording copyright).
27. VMG Salsoul, L.L.C. v. Ciccone, 824 F.3d 871, 877-78 (9th Cir. 2016)
28. Bridgeport Music, Inc. v. Dimension Films, 410 F.3d 792, 796 (6th Cir. 2005).
29. See id. at 800-01; Wisconsin Dep't of Revenue v. William Wrigley, Jr., Co.,
505 U.S. 214, 231 (1992).
30. Bridgeport Music, 410 F.3d at 801-02.
31. See Ciccone, 824 F.3d at 886; see also Batiste v. Najm, 28 F. Supp. 3d 595,
625 (E.D. La. 2014); Pryor v. Warner/Chappell Music, Inc., No. CV13-04344,
2014 WL 2812309, at *1, *7 n.3 (C.D. Cal. June 20, 2014); Saregama India
Ltd. v. Mosley, 687 F. Supp. 2d 1325, 1340-41 (S.D. Fla. 2009), affd, 635
F.3d 1284 (11th Cir. 2011).
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III. VMG SALSOUL V. CICCONE
A. Facts
The dispute originated in the production of the song Ooh I Love It (Love
Break) in the early 1980s.32 Shep Pettibone, who later produced Vogue
alongside Madonna, recorded the song. 33 In Love Break, there were "horn
hits," short blasts from horn instruments (trombones and trumpets), which
occurred in single and double forms several times throughout the song. 34 In
Vogue, a horn hit of similar nature played, but it was truncated, higher in
pitch, and in a different key.35 Notwithstanding that fact, VMG Salsoul
(VMG) alleged that Pettibone sampled the horn hits and used them in the
recording of Vogue.36 The Central District of California Court, applying the
de minimis exception, held that even if VMG proved the allegations of copy-
ing, its claim failed because the alleged portion copied was trivial.37 The
court granted summary judgment in favor of Madonna.3 8
On review, the Ninth Circuit found that Pettibone isolated a single horn
hit lasting less than a second, copied it, transposed it to a new key, shortened
it, then added other sound effects to the chord.39 Additionally, for the double
horn hit, Pettibone duplicated the copy of the single horn hit, then cut one of
the duplicates down to create a horn hit that sounded like it had a shorter
chord.40 Pettibone then blended the modified single and double horn hits with
other instrumentals to form the music for Vogue.41 The court also noted an
event that aided its analysis-when VMG's "primary expert originally mis-
identified the source of the sampled double horn hit."42 It was only after the
horn hit could be isolated that it was identified as a duplication of the single
horn hit in Love Break instead of a sampling of the original double horn hit.43
B.. The Court's Reasoning
In its analysis, the Ninth Circuit assumed that copying occurred for the
purposes of reviewing summary judgment since VMG introduced sufficient





37. Id. at 876.
38. Ciccone, 824 F.3d at 876.
39. Id. at 879-80.
40. Id.
41. Id.
42. Id. at 880.
43. Id.
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evidence of actual copying to create a genuine issue of material fact.44 Then,
the court addressed VMG's first argument, whether the horn hit itself was de
minimis.45 The court required more than proof of copying to establish copy-
right infringement; the copying itself had to be substantial in nature to qual-
ify.46 To determine if the portion copied was substantial, the court had to
determine if the appropriation could be recognized by the average audience.47
To this end, the court referenced the brief nature of the horn hits, occurring
only a few times in Vogue and each lasting less than a second.48 It also refer-
enced the mistake made by VMG's primary expert, concluding that an aver-
age audience member could do no better at identifying the sampling than a
highly qualified musician who listened to the recordings with the intent of
finding out what had been copied.49 These facts led the court to conclude that
the horn hit was de minimis, and thus, under Newton, Madonna's musical
composition was not actionable infringement.50
Next, the court addressed the plaintiff's alternative argument of whether
the de minimis exception could apply to the unauthorized use of the copy-
righted sound recordings.51 The Ninth Circuit analyzed the Sixth Circuit's
Bridgeport decision, VMG's primary authority, and ultimately rejected the
attempt to form a bright-line rule.52 The court began its counterargument to
the Bridgeport rule by supporting its own rule that copyright infringement
only occurs when a substantial portion of the original work is copied.53 The
court provided authorities stretching back to the mid-1800s, including a Su-
preme Court opinion that held a substantial portion must be copied to find
actionable infringement.54 The court then affirmed the "average audience"
44. Ciccone, 824 F.3d at 877. Specifically, "Tony Shimkin has sworn that he, as
Pettibone's personal assistant, helped with the creation of Vogue and that, in
Shimkin's presence, Pettibone directed an engineer to introduce sounds from
Love Break into the recording of Vogue." Id. Moreover, VMG "submitted re-
ports from music experts who concluded that the horn hits in Vogue were sam-
pled from Love Break." Id.
45. Id. at 878.
46. Id. at 880-81.
47. Id. at 878 (considering "whether a reasonable juror could conclude that the
average audience would recognize the appropriation.").
48. Id. at 880.
49. Id.
50. Ciccone, 824 F.3d at 880.
51. Id.
52. Id. at 886.
53. Id. at 880-81.
54. Id. ("[to] infringe [a copyright] a substantial copy of the whole or of a material
part must be produced") (citing Perris v. Hexamer, 99 U.S. 674, 676 (1878));
see Daly v. Palmer, 6 F. Cas. 1132, (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1868); Folsom v. Marsh, 9
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test by citing precedent stretching back to 1977.55 Explaining the reasoning
for the test, the court recognized that the plaintiffs injury stemmed from the
financial loss it would incur as a result of the infringing work depriving the
protected work of its audience.56 "Therefore, if the public does not recognize
the appropriation, the copier has not benefitted from the original artist's ex-
pressive content."57 Concluding this part of the analysis, the court noted that
courts outside the Sixth Circuit have consistently applied the de minimis rule
in all cases alleging copyright infringement.58
The court justified holding contrary to Bridgeport by interpreting rele-
vant sections of the Copyright Act in the context of congressional records.59
Beginning with Section 102, the court concluded that the provision afforded
no special treatment to the protection of sound recordings, nor did the statu-
tory definition of sound recordings in Section 101 seem to give any weight to
VMG's argument that Congress intended to create a special rule for sound
recordings that carved out the de minimis exception.60 The court then in-
spected Section 106, defining the exclusive rights of copyright holders and
again found nothing that suggested differential treatment of sound recordings
that would exclude the use of the de minimis exception.61 Finally, the court
looked at Section 114(b) and refused to follow the Sixth Circuit in reading an
implicit expansion of rights from an explicit limitation of rights.62 Instead,
the court naturally read the specific sentence cited by VMG as a limitation
that makes duplication of a copyrighted sound recording using independent
sounds (e.g. a cover band's imitation of a popular song) not an infringement
on the copyright.63 The court supported its refusal to find an implicit elimina-
tion of the "steadfast" de minimis exception with a House Report, which
F. Cas. 342 (C.C.D. Mass. 1841)); see also NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 6,
§ 13.03[A][2][a] (2013).
55. Ciccone, 824 F.3d at 880-81 (citing Sid & Marty Krofft Television Prods., Inc.
v. McDonald's Corp., 562 F.2d 1157, 1164 (9th Cir. 1977), superseded in part
by statute, 17 U.S.C. § 504(b) (2002)); see Fisher v. Dees, 794 F.2d 432, 434
n.2 (9th Cir. 1986) (describing the concept as "de minimis").
56. Ciccone, 824 F.3d at 881 ("[P]laintiff's legally protected interest [is] the poten-
tial financial return from his compositions which derive from the lay public's
approbation of his efforts.") (quoting Krofft, 562 F.2d at 1165).
57. Id.
58. Id. ("[W]e are aware of no case that has held that the de minimis doctrine does
not apply in a copyright infringement case. Instead, courts consistently have
applied the rule in all cases alleging copyright infringement.").
59. Id. at 881-82.
60. Id.
61. Id. at 882.
62. Ciccone, 824 F.3d at 882-83.
63. Id. at 883-84; see 17 U.S.C. § 114(b) (2002).
SMU Science and Technology Law Review
stated that "infringement takes place whenever all or any substantial portion
of the actual sounds that to make up a copyrighted sound recording are repro-
duced."64 This reading led the Ninth Circuit to reject the Sixth Circuit's inter-
pretation of Section 114(b)65 because the Sixth Circuit ignored the nature of
the statutory structure as an express limitation.66
Finally, the court exposed the Sixth Circuit's misguided reasoning in
Bridgeport.67 The Ninth Circuit rejected the Sixth Circuit's conclusion that
exclusive rights extend to the making of another sound recording that does
not consist entirely of an independent fixation of other sounds.68 That is, a
statement asserting that exclusive rights are limited in a particular circum-
stance does not automatically mean that the exclusive rights extend to all
other circumstances. 69 Accordingly, even if a purely independent replication
of a sound recording was not infringement under Section 114(b), that does
not mean that a recording, which is not purely independent, would be
infringement.70
The court further disagreed with the Sixth Circuit's reasoning that sam-
pling of any size physically-as opposed to intellectually-takes something
of value for three reasons. 71 First, the fact that the taking is physical did not
separate this from other areas of copyright law where the de minimis rule
applies.72 Second, the potential theoretical difference between sound record-
ings and other copyrighted works did not mean that Congress actually
adopted a difference that barred the use of de minimis exception.73 Finally,
the protection afforded by copyright covers "only the expressive aspects" of
the artistic work, not the "fruits of the [author's] labor," making the physical
taking immaterial.74
64. Ciccone, 824 F.3d at 883-84 (quoting H.R. Rep. No. 94-1476, at 106, re-
printed in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5659, 5721) (emphasis added)).
65. Bridgeport Music, Inc. v. Dimension Films, 410 F.3d 792, 801 (6th Cir. 2005)
(noting that "a sound recording owner has the exclusive right to 'sample' his
own recording.").




70. Id. at 885.
71. Id.
72. Ciccone, 824 F.3d at 885.
73. Id.
74. Id. (citing Feist Publ'ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 349
(1991)).
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C. Ciccone's Dissenting Opinion
Judge Silverman's dissent supported the Sixth Circuit's Bridgeport rul-
ing.75 Judge Silverman criticized the majority's ruling as a flawed justifica-
tion of a cumbersome rule that would weaken the rights of copyright
holders.76 Judge Silverman summarized both his and the Sixth Circuit's con-
clusion as a licensing requirement for sampling.?7 He argued that the proper
statutory analysis required reading Sections 106 and 114 together.78 This
reading revealed that only the holder of a sound recording copyright has the
exclusive rights to reproduce the work and to prepare derivative works in
which the recorded sounds are modified.79 That is, sound recording owners
have the exclusive right to sample their own recordings, but the owners can-
not claim copyright infringement if the sound in the recording is replicated
by a fixation of purely independent sounds.80
The dissent's second reason justifying the Sixth Circuit's conclusion
was that sound recordings are different from their compositional counterparts
because copying a fixed performance makes a de minimis analysis inapplica-
ble.81 Contrasting from the use of indiscernible photographs to dress a movie
set, the dissent characterized sampling as blatant theft.82 The act is deliberate
and involves the physical taking as the sound is fixed in a tangible medium
after it is recorded.83 Finally, the dissent cited congressional silence on the
issue in the wake of Bridgeport in the past twelve years as support, claiming
that while the congressional silence was not dispositive, such inaction had
probative value in showing legislative approval.84
IV. SUPPORT FOR THE DE MINIMIS EXCEPTION
A. Comparing Ciccone's Use of De Minimis and Bridgeport's Bright-
line Rule
The struggle is which legal principle should control the analysis when
someone samples a copyrighted recording: should we draw a bright line and
75. Id. at 888 (Silverman, J., dissenting) (citing Bridgeport Music, Inc. v. Dimen-
sion Films, 410 F.3d 792, 800-01 (6th Cir. 2005)).
76. See id. at 888, 890.
77. Id.
78. Ciccone, 824 F.3d at 888-89.
79. Id. at 888 ("[I1n which the actual sounds fixed in the recording are rearranged,
remixed, or otherwise in sequence or quality.").
80. Id. at 889.
81. Id.
82. See id. at 889.
83. Id.
84. Ciccone, 824 F.3d at 889-90.
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require every party to obtain a license before copying a single note, or should
we look at the sampling and determine whether the copying is substantial
enough for an actionable claim? The Ninth Circuit chose the latter approach,
departing from the Sixth Circuit's use of the former.85
In a procedural context, the Ninth Circuit advocates for a more flexible
yet inquiry-intensive approach, while the Sixth Circuit advocates a rule that
is easy to follow but makes no distinction between sampling a whole record-
ing or a small piece of it.86 However, the benefit of Bridgeport's bright-line
rule is diminished by the fact that it fails to save courts much effort in decid-
ing infringement cases.87 The fair use exception, characterized by Judge
Learned Hand as "the most troublesome in the whole law of copyright,"88
maintains a wide gray-area in determining when an infringement is actiona-
ble.89 In fact, the Bridgeport rule does not save courts from making a fact-
intensive inquiry when the fair use defense is raised, as the third statutory
factor in determining if a copying is fair use requires an analysis similar to
determining if the de minimis principle applies.90 By contrast, applying the
de minimis exception ties into the substantial similarity analysis, and that
finding must eventually be made to determine if the copying is actionable
infringement.91
B. A Case for De Minimis
The use of the de minimis exception is more in line with copyright juris-
prudence, as both the Ciccone dissent and the Sixth Circuit seem to overlook
key aspects of copyright law.92 To start, the Sixth Circuit's basis for its con-
clusion, as pointed out by the Ninth Circuit, is flawed on its face.93 To sup-
port this claim, Bridgeport cited the following clause in Section 114(b):
85. See generally id. at 879-80 (example of a de minimis analysis).
86. See id. at 890.
87. See Bridgeport Music, Inc. v. Dimension Films, 410 F.3d 792, 805 (6th Cir.
2005) (forming no opinion on the applicability of the fair use exception to these
facts).
88. Dellar v. Samuel Goldwyn, Inc., 104 F.2d 661, 662 (2d Cir. 1939).
89. NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 6, § 13.03(A)(2)(a) (2013).
90. See id. at § 13.03(A)(2)(b) n.114.35; see also 17 U.S.C. § 107(3) (2002) ("In
determining whether the use made of a work in any particular case is a fair use
the factors to be considered shall include . . . the amount and substantiality of
the portion used in relation to the copyrighted work as a whole. . . ."); Ringgold
v. Black Entm't Television Inc., 126 F.3d 70, 75 (2d Cir. 1997).
91. See Ringgold, 126 F.3d at 74-75.
92. See NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 6, § 13.03(A)(2)(b) (2013).
93. See VMG Salsoul, L.L.C. v. Ciccone, 824 F.3d 871, 884-85 (9th Cir. 2016).
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The exclusive rights of the owner of copyright in a sound record-
ing under clauses (1) and (2) of section 106 do not extend to the
making or duplication of another sound recording that consists en-
tirely of an independent fixation of other sounds, even though
such sounds imitate or simulate those in the copyrighted sound
recording.94
The Sixth Circuit relied on the use of "entirely" to conclude that if a copy-
right holder has no claim of infringement against a sound recording consist-
ing only of independent sounds, even if they sound like the original work,
then the holder must have a claim against a recording that does not consist
entirely of independent sounds.95 The Sixth Circuit thus committed an error
of interpretation by noting that Section 114(b) creates liability from a partial
sampling because Congress limited the liability of parties that create record-
ings like the copyrighted recording but are composed entirely of non-sam-
pled sounds. 96 Such an interpretation could easily be corrected by looking at
the legislative history of that clause.97 But the Sixth Circuit erroneously ig-
nored that history because digital sampling was rare in copyright displites
about sound recording in 1971 when protection for sound recordings was
being considered. However, while the technology was not widely available,
the practice existed and Congress considered the possibility of a partial cap-
turing of a sound recording.98 Congress still decided to retain the requirement
that a substantial amount be copied before infringement should be found.99
Bridgeport also seems to overstate the injury of sampling the de
minimis exception was protecting. An insubstantial sample, which average
consumers cannot recognize as appropriated, does not compromise the ex-
pressive content of the original work, nor does it deprive the original work of
its deserved recognition.100 For example, it is logical to assume that Vogue's
success-topping the charts all over the world in 1990, winning several
awards, and becoming a hit dance song-is not attributable to the use of a
few horn hits that last less than a second per piece.101 Nor can it be said that
94. Bridgeport Music, Inc. v. Dimension Films, 410 F.3d 792, 800 (6th Cir. 2005)
(citing 17 U.S.C. § 114(b) (2002)) (emphasis added).
95. Id.
96. NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 6, § 13.03(A)(2)(b) (2013).
-97. H.R. Rep. No. 94-1476, at 5675 (retaining the need for substantial copying for
infringement liability).
98. NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 6, § 13.03(A)(2)(b) n.114.16 (2013).
99. Id.
100. See VMG Salsoul, L.L.C. v. Ciccone, 824 F.3d 871, 880-81 (9th Cir. 2016).
101. See id. at 879-80.
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Love Break, having been released close to a decade before Vogue, lost any
recognition it had garnered by 1990 for the same reason. 102
The only area in which there is possible injury to be redressed is the
copyright holder's efforts in recording the sound, from which sampling al-
lows others to impermissibly profit.103 However, the Supreme Court has al-
ready clarified that copyright law protects only the expressive content of the
work.104 Copyrights were not made to protect "the sweat of the [artist's]
brow" but only the worth of the artistic expression found in the content of the
work.105 This leaves the Sixth Circuit without a reason to change the law as it
stands, since the court ruled out that it sought a new rule for the sake of
judicial economy.1 06
In addition, the Ciccone's dissent argument, that congressional silence
on the issue in the wake of Bridgeport supported the Sixth Circuit's conclu-
sion, is without merit. When Ciccone was being decided, there was proposed
legislation in the House of Representatives that would exempt "a non-sub-
scription broadcast of . .. an incidental use of a sound recording of a musical
work" from infringement.107 The common definition of incidental, "happen-
ing as a minor part or result of something else," arguably codifies the de
minimis exception into the Copyright Act's protection of sound record-
ings.108 While it could be argued that this action is marginal and may have no
effect on the case law, it serves to remove what little support the dissent
rested on. 09
C. A New Hope for Hip-Hop?
The Ninth Circuit gives more authority to the creation of art forms that
use sampling as a means of creative expression. The largest record label
companies sit in California and New York, meaning Ninth and Second Cir-
cuit rulings on copyright law in relation to music massively impact the indus-
try."1o Specifically, hip-hop music frequently samples sound recordings,
remixing several recordings from different sources to create "collage-like ar-
102. See id.
103. Id. at 885.
104. See Feist Publ'ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 349-50 (1991).
105. See id.; Ciccone, 824 F.3d at 885.
106. Bridgeport Music, Inc. v. Dimension Films, 410 F.3d 792, 802 (6th Cir. 2005).
107. H.R. 1733, 114th Cong. § 5(c) (2015).
108. See id.; MERRIAM-WEBSTER DICTIONARY, http://www.merriam-webster.com/
dictionary/incidental (last visited Nov. 2, 2016).
109. See Ciccone, 824 F.3d at 889.
110. Statistics and Facts on Record Labels in the U.S., STATISTA, https:/
www.statista.com/topics/2126/record-labels/ (last visited Oct. 2, 2016).
72 [Vol. XX
2017] Applying the De Minimis Exception to Music Sampling
tistry."111 In fact, some producers in the genre refer to the sampler-the
physical tool or software that samples a recording and is able to manipulate
it-as a musical instrument on its own.11 2 After Grand Upright, the days of
casual sampling came to an end, but the practice of sampling continued to
grow, only with the added difficulties of licensing.13 These problems usually
come from the lack of an industry standard on how to license recordings to
samplers, leading to factor-based considerations when negotiating licensing
agreements.1 4 This resulted in varying and sometimes excessive licensing
fees that damaged the availability and creative uses of sampling.115 It was
most likely because of this that unauthorized sampling continued.116 And was
aided, no doubt, by the fact that, until Bridgeport, the applicability of the de
minimis exception to sampling was not addressed.117
In a broader context, borrowing in music is not a concept that only arose
with the emergence of hip-hop. Going back to the days of classical music,
composers would frequently take inspiration from or borrow the work of
other composers to further their own creation. I8 While an argument could be
made that Section 114(b)'s protection of duplications based on independent
sounds was enacted to cover this sort of borrowing, sampling may just be
accomplishing the same goal of musical borrowing with new technology. In
affirming the use of the de minimis exception when analyzing sampled mu-
sic, the Ninth Circuit allows for this area of expression to grow.
Allowing the de minimis exception to be applied to sound recording
infringement cases beneficially strikes a balance between the competing pri-
vate and public interests.119 As stated above, a copy that an average audience
Ill. Evans, supra note 18, at 856.
112. Id. at 858.
113. See id. at 865.
114. Id. at 865-66 ("These factors include the stature of the sampling and sampled
artists, the success of the sampled song, the intended use, the duration and
content of the sample (hook versus a beat, for example), and the number of
times the sample is looped in the resulting track.").
115. Id.
116. See Bridgeport Music, Inc. v. Dimension Films, 410 F.3d 792, 802-03 (6th Cir.
2005) (describing the regime in place at the time of the decision).
117. Somoano, supra note 9, at 287-98; Gilmore, supra note 14, at 42.
118. Olufunmilayo B. Arewa, From J.C. Bach to Hip Hop: Musical Borrowing,
Copyright and Cultural Context, 84 N.C. L. REv. 547 (2006) ("Musicologists
use a number of terms to describe composers' uses of existing works, including
borrowing, self-borrowing, transformative imitation, quotation, allusion, hom-
- age, modeling, emulation, recomposition, influence, paraphrase and
indebtedness.").
119. See Reuven Ashtar, Theft, wTransformation, and the Need of the Immaterial: A
Proposal for A Fair Use Digital Sampling Regime, 19 ALB. L.J. Sci. & TECH.
261, 317 (2009).
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member cannot recognize as appropriated takes little, if anything, away from
the copyright owner. At the same time, the public, or more specifically, art-
ists unable to afford the production costs of professional music, are able to
advance creative expression, perhaps going as far as to create a new genre of
music. 120
V. CONCLUSION
While the law of "thou shalt not steal" is a principle central to western
civilization, it is still a law, and the Supreme Court has made it clear that the
law does not concern itself with trifles.121 The Ninth Circuit also made it
clear in Ciccone that the recording at issue was a trifle. At the same time, the
court ruled that the weight of authority-and logic-was against the Sixth
Circuit's attempt to create a bright-line infringement rule. The Sixth Circuit
lacked the foundation required to create a rule that turned the standards of
copyright law on their head. While choosing to create a split among the cir-
cuits was a drastic step, the Ninth Circuit has become the loudest voice in the
growing number of courts throughout the country that have decided not to
follow the Bridgeport decision. Hopefully, such a split will compel a judicial
or legislative remedy. For the time being, courts will have to independently
choose whether to stick with the fact-intensive analysis for finding a substan-
tial portion before finding infringement, or adopt a bright-line infringement
rule and come down hard on a burgeoning area of music and creative
expression.
120. See Arewa, supra note 118, at 597 (discussing how borrowing from past tradi-
tions serves as the foundation for new music, and "the variety and breadth of
such terminology gives a good indication of the widespread nature of borrow-
ing in the European classical music tradition.").
121. See Wisconsin Dep't of Revenue v. William Wrigley, Jr., Co., 505 U.S. 214,
231 (1992).
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